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Changes in Analysts’ Stock Recommendations Following  
Regulatory Action Against Their Brokerage 
 
 
 
Abstract: Despite the importance of sell-side analysts in the capital markets, we know little 
about the effectiveness of routine monitoring of the sell-side industry. We examine the attributes 
of sell-side research issued by analysts before and after their brokerage is subject to regulatory 
sanctions. We find that after a regulatory action, analysts at sanctioned brokerages lower their 
stock recommendations, both in absolute terms and relative to the recommendations of other 
analysts following the same firms. Following a regulatory action, analysts at sanctioned 
brokerages are also more likely than analysts at other brokerages to downgrade a company’s 
stock after the receipt of unfavorable information about the firm. Importantly, we document that 
analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages also reduce the optimism in their stock recommendations 
when a peer analyst’s brokerage is sanctioned, consistent with regulatory spillovers as a result of 
routine regulatory monitoring. Our study provides empirical evidence that regulatory action 
against sell-side brokerages is associated with a reduction in sell-side analysts’ positive bias at 
both sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokerages.  
 
Keywords: Analysts; sell-side; stock recommendations; FINRA; regulators
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1. Introduction 
Sell-side analysts play an important role in the capital markets by providing investors 
with industry knowledge, facilitating communication between investors and company 
management, and delivering research reports that summarize their assessments of firms’ future 
prospects (Schipper 1991; Brown 1993; Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp 2015). Although 
analysts serve these important purposes, many analysts—particularly those employed by 
brokerages offering underwriting or trading services—face conflicts of interest that potentially 
compromise the objectivity of their research (Mehran and Stulz 2007). In an effort to promote 
fair and transparent financial markets, Congress tasks the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) with creating and enforcing the rules that govern financial institutions, 
including sell-side brokerages. We examine the effect of routine monitoring of the sell-side 
industry on the stock recommendations of analysts employed by brokerages found to have 
violated these rules. 
FINRA oversees a variety of securities regulations (e.g., net capital requirements, 
distribution of securities, supervision of securities employees) in an effort to promote investor 
protection and cultivate what it describes as “fair financial markets” for all market participants. 
Prior to 2007, each U.S. stock exchange, such as the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD), individually operated enforcement divisions that regulated, monitored, and penalized 
financial institutions that violated securities regulations. We focus on regulatory actions 
specifically related to the research activities of sell-side analysts and their brokerages. We 
examine 81 violations of securities regulations related to sell-side research and imposed by 
FINRA and its predecessors from 1994 to 2014. These actions address issues such as 
inappropriate trading activity by analysts or members of their family, improper investment 
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banking influence over sell-side research, and inadequate or misleading disclosures in analyst 
reports. Unlike the Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2003, these regulatory actions are 
staggered in time and are the result of routine monitoring of sell-side brokerages.  
Understanding whether routine monitoring of sell-side brokerages is associated with a 
change in analyst behavior is important in light of concerns about the objectivity of sell-side 
research. Specifically, many analysts face conflicts of interest that potentially bias their research 
and limit its usefulness to buy-side institutions (Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp 2016), and 
these biases potentially put retail investors at a disadvantage. If analysts’ behavior is unaffected 
by regulatory sanctions, the effectiveness of the regulatory structure over sell-side research could 
be called into question, heightening concerns about oversight of sell-side research.  
There are several reasons to believe ex ante that we may not observe an association 
between regulatory actions and the properties of the published research produced by analysts at 
sanctioned brokerages. First, since 2007, the industry has been monitored by FINRA, which is a 
self-regulatory agency funded by the institutions it monitors. Hardy (2006) expresses concern 
“that the regulated institutions exercise excessive influence on the regulator” and “a captured 
regulator acts primarily in the interests of the regulatees, rather than in accordance with their 
putative mandate to promote the common good.” Relatedly, Corwin, Larocque, and Stegemoller 
(2017) conclude that industry-wide SRO rules are “largely ineffective” at curbing analyst bias. 
Other critics have similarly questioned the effectiveness of FINRA as a regulator of the securities 
industry (Haigney 2011). Second, researchers examining regulators in other settings have 
sometimes failed to find evidence of changes in company behavior after regulatory enforcement 
actions. For example, after the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board sanctioned Deloitte 
in 2007 for violating various auditing standards, Deloitte exhibited no discernible improvement 
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in audit quality (Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2015). Therefore, it is not obvious that 
enforcement actions resulting from the routine monitoring of the sell-side industry will be 
associated with a change in the properties of analysts’ research at sanctioned brokerages, 
particularly in light of the modest fines that accompany most of the actions in our sample. 
We compare the stock recommendations of analysts in the year immediately before and 
the year immediately after their brokerage is targeted for a regulatory action. We predict that 
regulatory actions will reduce the optimistic bias in analysts’ stock recommendations. We restrict 
our sample to stock recommendations issued by analysts employed at the same brokerage before 
and after the regulatory action and who issue recommendations for the same firm in both periods. 
We also control for other determinants of analysts’ stock recommendations (e.g., prior stock 
returns, meeting or beating the market’s expectations of earnings). Because we compare a 
common sample of analysts covering a common sample of firms, and because we measure stock 
recommendation bias relative to other analysts following the same firms in the same year, our 
research design allows us to speak directly to changes in analyst activity as a result of regulatory 
action.  
We find that analysts’ stock recommendations are less favorable, both in absolute terms 
and relative to other analysts following the same firms, in the year following a regulatory action, 
consistent with more conservative behavior from analysts at sanctioned brokerages. In practical 
terms, our findings suggest that, on average, approximately one in six stock recommendations is 
lower in the year following a regulatory action than in the year prior to the regulatory action 
(e.g., a “buy” rating instead of a “strong buy” rating, a “hold” rating instead of a “buy” rating). 
We note that these actions are distributed throughout our sample period; therefore, cross-
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sectional or time-series clustering in analysts’ stock recommendations is unlikely to explain our 
findings. 
Investor demand for information from analysts is particularly strong shortly after 
earnings are announced (Yezegel 2015). As a result, we also examine how analysts at sanctioned 
brokerages react to negative earnings news following a sanction and compare it to the reaction of 
analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages to the same negative news. Specifically, we identify firms 
that fail to meet or beat the market’s expectations of earnings and examine the likelihood that an 
analyst responds by downgrading the firm’s stock, conditional on whether the analyst’s 
brokerage was recently sanctioned. We predict that analysts whose brokerages were recently 
sanctioned will be more likely to downgrade their stock recommendations after a firm misses 
earnings expectations. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest that analysts 
at sanctioned brokerages interpret firm-specific news with less optimistic bias than do analysts at 
non-sanctioned brokerages covering the same firms.  
In additional analyses, we categorize the regulatory actions in our sample based on the 
types of violations committed by the brokerage. We categorize each violation into one or more of 
the following five categories: providing misleading information, conflicts of interest, sharing 
nonpublic information, concerns with the supervision of analysts, and other. We find that 
analysts whose brokerages were sanctioned for providing misleading information in their analyst 
reports issued more optimistic stock recommendations prior to the actions, on average, than 
other analysts. However, analysts at these brokerages significantly reduce their stock 
recommendations after the action, and analyst responses to regulatory actions for providing 
misleading information are greater than their reactions to all other types of violations. We also 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402180 
  5 
find that analysts at sanctioned brokerages are more likely to downgrade their stock 
recommendations after their brokerage’s first violation than after subsequent violations.  
Prior research documents that revisions to analysts’ stock recommendations elicit a 
meaningful capital market reaction (Francis and Soffer 1997; Bradley, Clarke, Lee, and 
Ornthanalai 2014), and we find that this reaction is unchanged for recommendation upgrades 
issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages after a regulatory action. However, we observe a 
stronger market reaction to stock recommendation downgrades issued by these analysts 
following a regulatory action, suggesting that investors are aware of regulatory sanctions and 
believe downgrades issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages become more credible following 
a regulatory action. 
In our final test, we examine whether the tendency to lower their stock recommendations 
following a regulatory action extends to peer analysts from non-sanctioned brokerages who 
observe the routine monitoring of other brokerages. We identify peer analysts as those who are 
employed by a non-sanctioned brokerage and follow at least one of the firms covered by an 
analyst employed by a brokerage at the time it is subject to a regulatory action. We find that 
analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages also issue less favorable stock recommendations in the 
year following an action against a peer brokerage, although the reduction in stock 
recommendation optimism is not as large as it is for analysts at sanctioned brokerages. This 
finding is consistent with regulatory spillovers in the sell-side industry, and it suggests the effects 
of routine oversight of the financial industry extend beyond the specific brokerages formally 
sanctioned. Although recent research suggests that large, one-time regulatory events do not 
always impact peer analysts (Corwin et al. 2017), our finding that routine, ongoing monitoring is 
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associated with peer effects is consistent with the deterrence effects established in other 
literatures (e.g., Nagin 2013). 
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. Considerable research has 
examined analysts’ stock recommendations (Womack 1996; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and 
Trueman 2001; Jegadeesh and Kim 2006; Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman 2010; Li, Ramesh, 
Shen, and Wu 2015; Yezegel 2015), and frequently acknowledges the optimistic bias in sell-side 
research (Dugar and Nathan 1995; Hayes 1998; O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin 2005; Chen and 
Matsumoto 2006; Ramnath, Rock, and Shane 2008; Brown et al. 2016). Prior research speaks to 
various market-based mechanisms that discipline analysts’ incentives to issue biased research, 
such as reputation (Fang and Yasuda 2009) and institutional ownership (Ljungqvist, Marston, 
Starks, Wei, and Yan 2007). Our study, however, examines another mechanism—regulatory 
oversight—that disciplines sell-side research, and finds that formal sanctions that result from 
routine oversight lead to less optimistic research from both the sanctioned brokerage’s analysts 
and other analysts covering the same firms. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the impact of regulation on analyst 
behavior. Prior research documents that analysts’ research is less informative following the 
passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) (Gintschel and Markov 2004) and that NASD 
Rule 2711 enhanced analyst independence (Chen and Chen 2009). In addition, while Corwin et 
al. (2017) find that analysts at sanctioned brokerages reduced their optimistic bias following the 
2003 Global Settlement, they find no evidence that analysts employed by brokerages not directly 
sanctioned by the Global Settlement changed their behavior. The authors note that “the limited 
impact on non-sanctioned banks suggests that industry-wide [self-regulatory organization] rules 
were largely ineffective at reducing the influence of investment banking on analyst research.” 
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Our study contributes to this line of research by finding that (a) routine, ongoing industry-wide 
regulation is associated with a reduction in sell-side optimism, and (b) this effect extends beyond 
the sanctioned brokerages themselves. As such, our findings shed new light on the efficacy of 
regulatory oversight of sell-side research. 
We acknowledge that we are unable to observe misconduct that goes undetected by 
regulators, and that even among the cases of discovered misconduct, imposing discipline on 
analysts’ stock recommendations is not the only objective of regulatory oversight of the sell-side 
industry. As a result, our study cannot fully answer questions about the effectiveness of 
regulatory oversight of the sell-side industry. However, we argue that the observable 
consequences of these actions that we document are likely to be associated with other 
unobservable effects of regulatory scrutiny. Further, while analysts’ stock recommendations are 
not the most important service sell-side analysts provide to institutional investors (Brown et al. 
2016), their stock recommendations are likely more valuable to retail investors who, unlike 
institutional investors, do not employ their own research staff (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
2007). Given that one of the objectives of regulatory oversight is “to ensure that every investor 
receives the basic protections they deserve” (FINRA 2016), our findings speak directly to the 
effectiveness of regulators in achieving this goal.  
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Regulatory Oversight of Sell-Side Analysts 
 FINRA monitors and regulates the securities industry to ensure “investor protection and 
market integrity” (FINRA 2016). Prior to 2007, each U.S. stock exchange (Nasdaq, NYSE, and 
AMEX) individually operated enforcement divisions, such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD), that regulated, monitored, and penalized financial institutions that 
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violated securities regulations. In 2007, the United States Congress authorized the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to merge the stock exchanges’ enforcement divisions to form 
FINRA, a self-regulating organization that oversees the securities industry, including almost 
4,000 financial institutions and over 640,000 individuals.  
 FINRA is a member organization and requires financial institutions and their 
professionals to register and comply with industry rules and regulations of FINRA and the SEC. 
The rules and regulations include, but are not limited to, maintaining membership with FINRA, 
implementing and documenting organizational policies and procedures, and reporting and 
monitoring employee conflicts of interests. For example, FINRA established Rule 2711 to ensure 
sell-side analysts and their published reports are truthful and disclose all relevant information 
about a covered firm’s securities (FINRA 2015). Rule 2711 also establishes rules to reduce 
conflicts of interest in the financial system. For instance, investment banking professionals are 
restricted from supervising research analysts or from determining analysts’ compensation. 
Further, all communication between analysts and investment banking personnel must be 
documented and must occur in the presence of or through an authorized intermediary. Analysts 
are also allowed to provide drafts of their research reports to covered companies to verify the 
facts in the reports, but only if the reports do not contain the research summary, price target, or 
rating. Analysts are also restricted from trading securities in a manner that is inconsistent with 
their reports. 
 Other regulators, such as the SEC, also monitor the conduct of analysts and their 
brokerage firms and issue penalties when securities laws are violated. An example of a 
significant SEC action against brokerage firms for research-related activities is the Global 
Settlement. The Global Settlement was a result of inappropriate investment banking influence 
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over analysts that led to analysts publishing positive research to help secure investment banking 
services (Securities and Exchange Commission 2003). As a result, the SEC ordered ten of the 
largest financial institutions to pay fines totaling over $1 billion.  
2.2 Prior Research 
 Prior research on the regulation of sell-side analysts focuses primarily on the impact of 
industry-wide regulation, such as Reg FD or NASD Rule 2711 (now FINRA Rule 2711), and 
other large-scale actions, such as the Global Settlement, on sell-side research. For example, 
Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) find analyst recommendations are less biased 
following the Global Settlement, and Corwin et al. (2017) find the Global Settlement reduced 
optimistic bias in analysts employed by the targeted brokerages. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and 
Trueman (2006) find stock recommendations became less optimistic following the passage of 
NASD Rule 2711, and Chen and Chen (2009) find that analysts’ stock recommendations exhibit 
a stronger relation with intrinsic value estimates and a weaker relation with conflicts of interest, 
following the passage of NASD Rule 2711. Other studies examine the information content of 
analyst research following the implementation of Reg FD, finding mixed evidence on the 
regulation’s effectiveness in eliminating the private disclosure of material information. For 
example, Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003) find analyst forecast dispersion increased following 
Reg FD, suggesting forecasting earnings became more difficult without access to material 
private information. Heflin, Sabramanyam, and Zhang (2003), however, find no change in 
forecast dispersion after Reg FD. Our study contributes to this literature by examining specific 
brokerages accused of violating regulatory statutes (rather than the effect of industry-wide 
implementation of new regulation) and the implications of the resulting sanctions for sell-side 
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research. Further, our study evaluates analyst reactions to a broad sample of sanctions that result 
from routine monitoring of sell-side brokerages. 
 Several studies also examine market-based channels through which sell-side research is 
disciplined. For example, Fang and Yasuda (2009) find that All-Star analysts are less likely to 
succumb to pressure to bias their research in an effort to secure underwriting revenue for their 
brokerage than are non-All-Stars, suggesting that reputation effects help discipline sell-side 
research. In addition, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) find that analysts who issue relatively 
more accurate earnings forecasts are less likely to lose their jobs, while Hong and Kubik (2003) 
find that forecast accuracy leads to promotions to more prestigious sell-side brokerages, 
suggesting that labor market concerns encourage analysts to publish high-quality research. 
Finally, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) document that the optimism in analysts’ stock recommendations 
is declining in institutional ownership in the covered firm, suggesting that analysts have 
incentives to provide high-quality research to institutional clients.    
Two other studies, Brown, Hugon, and Lu (2010) and Pacelli (2019), rely on data 
obtained from FINRA (or its predecessor, NASD). Brown et al. (2010) examine background 
disclosures about individual analysts provided by the NASD and examine the association 
between these disclosures and properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. These background 
disclosures are self-reported by the analysts, their brokerage firms, or a government agency, and 
include information about various aspects of the analyst’s history, including criminal actions, 
personal bankruptcies, and loss of employment. Brown et al. (2010) find that analysts included in 
these background disclosures issue less accurate earnings forecasts that tend to elicit a weaker 
market reaction. Whereas Brown et al. (2010) examine associations between disclosures about 
analysts’ backgrounds and properties of sell-side research, we examine changes in analyst 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402180 
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behavior following formal regulatory sanctions. Further, all the regulatory actions in our sample 
pertain to violations inside the research department of sell-side brokerages, while the disclosures 
examined by Brown et al. (2010) include information unrelated to sell-side research (e.g., 
personal bankruptcies). 
Pacelli (2019) relies on FINRA data to investigate whether analyst forecast quality is 
lower among analysts employed by brokerages with a weak compliance culture and identifies 
brokerages as having a weak compliance culture if they have been accused by FINRA of 
violations in their non-research divisions. Pacelli (2019) documents lower forecast quality for 
analysts employed at institutions with securities violations in non-research activities, suggesting 
that a culture of misconduct in one department can permeate the organization. Our study is 
unique in that we examine (a) sanctions related directly to sell-side analysts and their research, 
and (b) changes in analyst behavior following FINRA sanctions. How analysts respond to 
regulatory sanctions against the research division of their brokerage is an open question that we 
address in our study.  
2.3 Hypotheses 
Prior research documents that analysts have many incentives to issue optimistically 
biased stock recommendations. For example, analysts whose brokerages provide investment 
banking services tend to issue more optimistic stock recommendations (Dugar and Nathan 1995; 
Lin and McNichols 1998) and are slower to downgrade their recommendations relative to other 
analysts (O’Brien et al. 2005). Further, analysts with ties to investment banking departments are 
more likely to release recommendation downgrades during times of low investor attention to 
maintain favorable relations with management (Rees, Sharp, and Wong 2017). Analysts also 
engage in strategic behaviors to gain access to management (Dugar and Nathan 1995; Ke and Yu 
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2006; Mayew 2008; Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 2013; Brown et al. 2015). Consistent 
with these incentives, Agrawal and Chen (2008) document that from 1994 to 2003, only 5.7% of 
sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations were either “sell” or “strong sell.”  
Regulatory sanctions impose both direct and indirect costs on a brokerage and its 
analysts. For example, in our sample the median (mean) monetary fine against brokerages for 
analyst misconduct is $225,000 ($6.1 million), and some fines are as large as $200 million. In 
addition, analysts employed by sanctioned brokerages face possible reputational costs that could 
impair their credibility with their investing clients and the management of the companies they 
follow. For example, we found press coverage for 31 out of 81 sanctions in our sample (about 38 
percent). Therefore, sanctioned brokerages likely face strong incentives to minimize the 
probability of another violation.  
Further, prior research in other settings has demonstrated that companies and institutions 
respond to public scrutiny by changing personnel or practices. For example, Chakravarthy, 
deHaan, and Rajgopal (2014) find that companies subject to earnings restatements seek to repair 
the reputational capital by engaging in various corporate activities, such as restructuring the firm 
or revamping its internal controls, while Srinivasan (2005) finds that companies respond to 
restatements by replacing a large percentage of its directors (particularly members of the audit 
committee). Similarly, Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde (2016) find that companies respond to public 
scrutiny by providing additional disclosure and by reducing tax avoidance activity. Given the 
desire brokerages will have to repair any reputational damage associated with a regulatory 
violation, we predict that sanctioned brokerages will seek to minimize further regulatory 
attention and that their analysts will issue less optimistic research after their brokerage is 
sanctioned for violating a regulatory statute. We state our first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: Analysts’ stock recommendations are less optimistic following a research-related 
regulatory sanction against the analyst’s brokerage. 
 
In spite of our formal hypothesis and as noted above, there are several reasons why we 
may not observe an association between regulatory violations and properties of the published 
research issued by analysts employed at sanctioned brokerages. First, one concern in any 
regulated industry is the notion of regulatory capture, which is “the possibility that the regulated 
institutions exercise excessive influence on the regulator” and “a captured regulator acts 
primarily in the interests of the regulatees, rather than in accordance with their putative mandate 
to promote the common good” (Hardy 2006). Given that FINRA is a member organization 
funded by the institutions it monitors, we cannot rule out the possibility that FINRA (or its 
predecessors) is ineffective in curtailing the behavior of the analysts employed by the brokerages 
it sanctions. Second, some prior research has failed to find evidence of changes in company 
behavior after regulatory enforcement actions. Specifically, after the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board sanctioned Deloitte in 2007 for violating various auditing 
standards, Deloitte exhibited no discernible improvement in audit quality (Boone, Khurana, and 
Raman 2015). Therefore, it is not obvious that regulatory sanctions will be associated with a 
change in the properties of sell-side research issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages.1  
We also examine the reaction of analysts at sanctioned brokerages to negative 
information about the firms they cover. Prior research (Altinkiliç and Hansen 2009) documents 
that many analysts revise their stock recommendations shortly after earnings announcements, 
and Yezegel (2015) finds that this clustering is driven by greater demands for information from 
                                                        
1 We also note that the frequency of an audit by FINRA is a function of the broker’s size and business model 
(Pacelli 2019). The discovery of misconduct may be more likely at larger, more complex brokerages that are subject 
to a more frequent audit. However, it may be more difficult for a regulator to identify misconduct at a large, 
complex broker. Our tests do not model the probability of misconduct being discovered at a given brokerage, and 
instead take FINRA violations as given and examine the consequences of these sanctions.  
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investors after earnings are released. As a result, the activity of analysts at sanctioned brokerages 
immediately following earnings announcements provides a natural setting to examine the effect 
of regulatory oversight on analysts’ stock recommendations. Given the regulatory spotlight on 
sanctioned brokerages, we predict that analysts at these brokerages will be less optimistically 
biased when interpreting negative firm news than analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages covering 
the same firms at the same time. Specifically, we predict that analysts employed by sanctioned 
brokerages are more likely than their non-sanctioned counterparts to downgrade their stock 
recommendations after firms announce negative earnings news.  
H2: Analysts at sanctioned brokerages are more likely than analysts at non-sanctioned 
brokerages to downgrade their stock recommendations following a negative earnings 
surprise. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection  
We identify research-related regulatory actions against brokerages from FINRA’s 
BrokerCheck website (http://brokercheck.finra.org).2 BrokerCheck provides a detailed report 
containing a summary of the institution’s history and operations, along with a list of any pending 
or finalized regulatory actions against each financial institution operating within the United 
States. The report includes the date the action was initiated, the regulatory body that initiated the 
action, an explanation of the allegation, and a list of sanctions ordered against the brokerage. 
These actions could be a result of periodic examinations that determine the broker’s adherence to 
the rules governing the financial industry or other exams based on information received through 
                                                        
2 We obtain all of the regulatory actions in our sample through FINRA’s BrokerCheck service, and most actions 
(72%) are initiated by FINRA or its predecessor. Other regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
initiate regulatory actions when securities laws are violated, and these violations are also included in BrokerCheck. 
For parsimony, we refer to all actions in our sample as regulatory actions by FINRA. 
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FINRA’s Investor Complaint Center and Whistleblower Tip-Line. Brokers disclose regulatory 
actions and disciplinary events within 30 days of the event, and these disclosures are made when 
the firm is “the subject of a final regulatory action, convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to 
certain crimes, subject to a civil injunction…or found in a civil court to have been involved in a 
violation of investment-related statutes or regulations, or named as a respondent or defendant in 
an arbitration or civil litigation” (FINRA 2018).  
 We focus our analysis on regulatory actions specifically related to sell-side research. To 
identify these violations, we searched the description of each violation for the words “research” 
or “analyst.” We then read the details of each action to ensure the actions relate to financial 
analysts and eliminated any unrelated action from our sample. We matched institution names 
associated with these violations in BrokerCheck to the brokerages listed in the IBES U.S. 
recommendations file.3 In total, we collected information on 81 research-related regulatory 
sanctions from 1994 to 2014 filed against 50 brokerages covered by IBES. Appendix B contains 
a sample of research-related regulatory sanctions from FINRA BrokerCheck reports.  
 Table 1 provides information about the violations in our sample. In Panel A, we report 
the number of research-related sanctions in each year of our sample. Sanctions were relatively 
infrequent in the earliest years of our sample, with only three sanctions from 1994 through 1999. 
However, sanctions became more frequent and peaked from 2003 through 2006, with between 
eight and ten sanctions per year. In Panel B, we report that 36 of the 50 brokerages included in 
our sample were sanctioned only once during our sample period, with 14 brokerages sanctioned 
more than once. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                        
3 The IBES recommendation file contains the analyst’s first initial, last name, and an abbreviated name of the 
brokerage releasing the recommendation.  
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3.2 Violation Type 
In Panel C of Table 1, we provide descriptive evidence on the nature of the violations in 
our sample. To identify the type of violation outlined in each action, two authors independently 
reviewed each sanction and categorized the violation into the following five types of violations, 
noting that many actions are associated with more than one type of violation: 
MISLEAD – The analyst report contained misleading information. 
COI – Conflicts of interest at the brokerage firm, including allegations related to 
investment banking activity, analyst compensation, and analyst trading activity. 
NONPUB – The release of non-public information, including the release of a draft report 
to a covered company with inappropriate content included in the report or failure to disclose 
relevant information about analysts’ public appearances. 
SUPER – Inappropriate supervision of analysts, lack of adequate policies and procedures, 
lack of appropriate disclosure, and/or disclosures that contained errors. 
OTHER – Other violations, such as the failure to comply with ongoing investigations 
against the brokerage and unregistered analysts issuing reports. 
We find that 65 of the 81 violations in our sample include some mention of an issue with 
supervision or disclosure and that 46 include some type of conflict of interest (e.g., inappropriate 
communication with the brokerage’s investment banking division, analyst trading against his/her 
research). Allegations of issuing misleading research are included in 12 of the violations. The 
regulatory actions outlined in Appendix B provide examples for each type of violation. 
3.3 Research Design 
Given that that regulators seek to promote a fair financial market for all investors, and 
because retail investors use sell-side analysts’ recommendations to make investing decisions 
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(Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006), we focus our attention on the stock recommendations 
analysts issue before and after a regulator sanction. For each analyst employed by a sanctioned 
brokerage, we identify the last stock recommendation issued for a firm prior to the date of a 
regulatory action, as well as the first stock recommendation issued after the regulatory action.4 
We require the analyst to have issued a stock recommendation for a given firm in the 365 days 
prior to the regulatory action and a stock recommendation for the same firm within 365 days 
after the regulatory action. This requirement creates balance in our sample and allows us to use 
the analyst as his/her own control, accounting for unobserved analyst characteristics that may be 
associated with properties of the analyst’s stock recommendations. Further, this requirement 
ensures that we examine only stock recommendations issued within reasonable proximity to the 
regulatory event. Because we measure some of the variables in our model relative to other 
analysts following the same firms, we eliminate stock recommendations issued for firms with 
fewer than three analysts following the firm. We also eliminate any recommendation (and its 
associated pair) without requisite data for our model. Further, we require analysts to be employed 
by the same brokerage in both the pre-sanction and the post-sanction periods. Our final sample 
includes 11,354 recommendations issued by 1,256 analysts employed by 50 brokerages relating 
to 81 research-related regulatory actions.  
We test our first hypotheses using the following model:  
 DV = β0 + β1Post_Action + Controls + Year + Brokerage + ε (1) 
 We employ three separate versions of the dependent variable to test H1. First, SR is equal 
to the recommendation level issued by the analyst, where “strong buy” is equal to 2, “buy” is 
                                                        
4 FINRA’s BrokerCheck website provides both the date that the regulatory action was initiated and the date that it 
was resolved. We focus on the date the regulatory action was initiated and examine the first stock recommendation 
issued after this date. 
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equal to 1, “hold” is equal to 0, “sell” is equal to -1, and “strong sell/underperform” is equal to    
-2.5 Second, Downgrade is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock recommendation is 
lower than the analyst’s previous stock recommendation, and equal to zero otherwise. Third, 
SR_Rel measures the analyst’s stock recommendations relative to the consensus of all 
outstanding recommendations for the covered firm. More (less) optimistic stock 
recommendations are consistent with high (lower) values of SR_Rel. Thus, SR_Rel examines the 
stock recommendations issued by analysts employed by sanctioned brokerages relative to the 
stock recommendations for the same firms issued by analysts employed by non-sanctioned 
brokerages. We estimate an OLS regression when SR or SR_Rel is the dependent variable and 
logistic regression when Downgrade is the dependent variable. 
Our variable of interest is Post_Action, which is a dichotomous variable equal to one if 
the stock recommendation was issued within 365 days following a regulatory action against the 
analyst’s brokerage, and equal to zero if the stock recommendation was issued in the 365 days 
prior to the regulatory action. H1 predicts that analysts issue less optimistic stock 
recommendations following a regulatory action, and that the coefficient on Post_Action will be 
negative.  
We control for several analyst and brokerage characteristics in our model, including the 
analyst’s experience following the firm (Firm_Exp) and as a sell-side analyst (Gen_Exp), the 
number of firms the analyst follows (Follow), and the size of the analyst’s brokerage 
(Broker_Size). These variables are standardized relative to the same characteristics for other 
analysts following the same firm in the same year (Clement and Tse 2003, 2005). We also 
control for the firm’s stock price performance in the month prior to the recommendation 
                                                        
5 We modify SR to create three recommendation level categories (buy, hold, and sell) and find similar results. 
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announcement (Bhar) and whether the firm meet or beat the consensus earnings forecast in the 
period prior to the recommendation announcement (Meetbeat). We also control for potential 
strategic behaviors that might be associated with the favorableness of an analyst’s stock 
recommendation. For example, we control for the ability of the analyst’s brokerage to underwrite 
debt or equity securities (Underwriter). All variables are defined in Appendix A, all regressions 
include year and brokerage fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors by analyst. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the 11,354 stock recommendations in 
our sample. The average stock recommendation has a value of 0.513 (SR), which is between a 
“buy” (1) and a “hold” (0) and is significantly greater than zero (untabulated p-value < 0.01) and 
consistent with the general optimistic bias in analysts’ stock recommendations (Dugar and 
Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Brown et al. 2015). 
Approximately 38% of the stock recommendation revisions in our sample are downgrades 
(Downgrade). The average value of SR_Rel is -0.046 (untabulated p-value < 0.01). We also 
report descriptive statistics for the independent variables we use in Equation (1).  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
In Panel B of Table 2, we report mean values of SR, Downgrade, and SR_Rel, separately 
for the stock recommendations issued before and after the action. The mean value of SR in the 
post-sanction period is 0.418, which is significantly lower than the mean of 0.607 in the pre-
sanction period. In addition, analysts employed by sanctioned brokerages are more likely to 
downgrade their recommendations in the post-sanction period than in the pre-sanction period. 
Similarly, the mean value of SR_Rel in the pre-sanction period is 0.009, which is insignificantly 
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different from zero (p-value = 0.45, untabulated). However, the mean value of SR_Rel in the 
post-sanction period is -0.101, which is significantly lower than the mean of 0.009 in the pre-
sanction period. These preliminary findings are consistent with H1, and suggest that prior to the 
regulatory action, analysts at sanctioned brokerages issued stock recommendations that were 
very similar to the mean stock recommendation issued by all other analysts, but that after the 
action, analysts at sanctioned brokerages issued less optimistic stock recommendations.   
4.2 Regression Results 
We report the results of our test of H1 in Table 3. In Column (1), we present the results of 
estimating Equation (1) when the dependent variable is SR. We find a significantly negative 
coefficient on Post_Action (-0.186, p-value < 0.01), consistent with analysts issuing less 
favorable stock recommendations in the year after their brokerage is sanctioned than in the year 
prior to the sanction. In practical terms, this coefficient suggests that, on average, approximately 
one out of six stock recommendations issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages is one grade 
lower (i.e., “buy” instead of “strong buy,” “hold” instead of “buy”) following regulatory 
sanctions against their brokerage. The coefficients on the control variables suggest that stock 
recommendations are generally more favorable if the firm recently met or exceeded earnings 
expectations (Meetbeat), or if the analyst’s brokerage provides underwriting services 
(Underwriter). 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 In Column (2), we estimate a logistic regression where the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the analyst’s stock recommendation revision is a 
downgrade of the company’s stock, and equal to zero if the revision is a reiteration or an 
upgrade. We test whether analysts are more likely to downgrade the company’s stock in the 
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period immediately following regulatory sanctions than in the period immediately prior to 
regulatory sanctions. This model mirrors Equation (1), except (a) it is a logistic regression rather 
than an OLS regression, (b) we eliminate observations where the analyst’s prior stock 
recommendation was Underperform, because these recommendations cannot be downgraded, 
and (c) we include three additional control variables (StrongBuy, Buy, and Sell) to control for the 
level of the analyst’s prior stock recommendation. As outlined in Column (2), we find that 
analysts are more likely to downgrade their stock recommendations in the period immediately 
following regulatory sanctions against their brokerage than in the period prior to the sanction.6 
The coefficient on several control variables is consistent with intuition. For example, analysts 
with considerable experience covering the firm (Firm_Exp) are less likely to downgrade the 
company’s stock. In addition, analysts with a sell (buy) rating are less (more) likely to issue a 
downgrade.7 
 One possible concern with the results presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 is that 
we do not control for firm news that might be associated with analysts’ stock recommendations. 
For example, if the covered firms are systematically more likely to face bad news in the post-
sanction period than in the pre-sanction period, one would expect analysts to issue less favorable 
stock recommendations at that time for reasons unrelated to the brokerage’s recent sanction. 
However, we note that the sanctions we examine are scattered throughout our sample period, 
such that the post-sanction period for one sanction often precedes the pre-sanction period for 
                                                        
6 Logistic regression containing numerous fixed effects have the potential for bias in the estimated coefficients 
(Greene 2004). We re-estimate our tests of the likelihood of a downgrade using an OLS regression and our 
inferences are the same. 
7 In untabulated results, we also find that in the year following FINRA events, analysts at sanctioned brokerages 
issue less optimistically biased (and more accurate) earnings and target price forecasts.  
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other sanctions.8 Further, while we argue that regulatory actions are important events for analysts 
employed by the sanctioned brokerages, there is little reason to expect a regulatory action against 
an individual brokerage (and not against the firm the analyst is covering or against other 
brokerages employing analysts covering the firm) to be systematically associated with firm-
specific news that would lead analysts to change their assessment of the company or its stock. 
 Nevertheless, to more fully rule out alternative explanations for our results, in Column 
(3) we estimate Equation (1) where the dependent variable is SR_Rel, which is measured as the 
analyst’s stock recommendation level less the consensus recommendation level for all analysts 
following the firm. Because this variable measures the analyst’s stock recommendation relative 
to other analysts following the same firm at the same time, it holds constant any news that might 
otherwise be associated with the analysts’ views of the firm. When we estimate this model using 
SR_Rel as the dependent variable, the coefficient on Post_Action is significantly negative 
(-0.112, p-value < 0.01), consistent with the notion that analysts issue less favorable stock 
recommendations following sanctions against their brokerage, even relative to other analysts 
following the same stock.9 In general, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with 
H1.10 
                                                        
8 Relatedly, a stock recommendation in the pre-sanction period for one analyst may coincide with a stock 
recommendation in the post-sanction period for a different analyst covering the same firm but employed by a 
different brokerage. 
9 Kadan et al. (2009) conduct a thorough examination of the Global Settlement and other regulations on analysts’ 
stock recommendations, and note that following these regulations most brokerages migrated from a 5-tier to a 3-tier 
rating system. In our tests we employ the same system used by the brokerage at the time the analyst issued the 
forecast, noting that our inferences are robust to the use of a 3-tier (rather than 5-tier) recommendation rating system 
throughout.  
10 We find no difference in behavior following FINRA violations based on the size of the sanctioned brokerage, 
suggesting that the effect we document is not limited to only analysts employed by small brokerages. We note, 
however, that the analysts at sanctioned brokerages who were most optimistic prior to the sanction are associated 
with the largest reductions in stock recommendation optimism following the sanction.  
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We note that some of the sanctions in our sample are related to the Global Settlement. 
Because Corwin et al. (2017) offer a thorough investigation of the behavior of analysts employed 
by banks included in the Global Settlement, and to ensure that these sanctions do not drive our 
results, we re-estimate Equation (1) using a sample of sanctions not related to the Global 
Settlement. To identify sanctions related to the Global Settlement, we read the allegation and 
sanction detail in BrokerCheck for each financial institution included in the Global Settlement. 
We match the description of the allegation and the fines paid to those described in the Global 
Settlement, and in many cases the sanction specifically refers to the Global Settlement. In 
untabulated tests, we find that the results are consistent with those presented in Table 3. To 
further alleviate concerns that our findings are driven by the Global Settlement and its impact on 
the brokerage industry, we also (a) omit all violations from 2003 and 2004, and (b) only examine 
violations from 1994 through 2002 that unambiguously pre-date the Global Settlement. We find 
similar results (untabulated) in both tests. 
4.3 Stock Recommendations Following Earnings Misses 
 In Table 4, we present the results of our test of H2. Specifically, following an 
announcement of negative news by covered firms, we compare the likelihood that analysts 
employed by sanctioned brokerages downgrade their stock recommendations with the likelihood 
that analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages downgrade their recommendations for the same firms.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
We identify all firms covered by analysts at sanctioned brokerages at the time of the 
regulatory action and focus on the first stock recommendation following the action issued by an 
analyst from a sanctioned brokerage. We retain only stock recommendations that are preceded by 
an earnings miss (i.e., reported earnings below analysts’ consensus estimate) in order to isolate 
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analysts’ response to negative firm news. In addition, we only include analysts at non-sanctioned 
brokerages in this analysis if their prior stock recommendation (before the earnings 
announcement) was the same as the prior stock recommendation of the analyst at a sanctioned 
brokerage. This requirement ensures that we compare the likelihood of downgrading the firm’s 
stock across analysts with similar assessments of the stock prior to the earnings miss. Lastly, we 
consider only stock recommendations issued prior to the subsequent earnings announcement. To 
formally test H2, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
Downgrade = β0 + β1Sanctioned_Analyst + Controls + Brokerage + ε (2) 
Sanctioned_Analyst is an indicator variable equal to one for analysts employed by a sanctioned 
brokerage, and equal to zero otherwise. The control variables in Equation (2) are identical to 
those employed in Equation (1), except we no longer control for Meetbeat given that all stock 
recommendations follow earnings misses, by design, or the analyst’s prior stock 
recommendation level, given that analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages are included in the 
analysis only if their prior recommendation level is identical to that of an analyst at a sanctioned 
brokerage who covers the same firm.11 H2 predicts that the coefficient on Sanctioned_Analyst 
will be positive, consistent with analysts at sanctioned brokerages being more likely to 
downgrade (as opposed to upgrade or reiterate) their stock recommendations following earnings 
misses than are analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages.  
Consistent with H2, the positive and significant coefficient for Sanctioned_Analysts 
(0.394, p-value = 0.01) in Table 4 indicates that analysts at sanctioned brokerages are 1.48 times 
more likely than analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages to downgrade their stock 
                                                        
11 We also omit year fixed effects because all stock recommendations issued by the analysts at sanctioned 
brokerages and by the corresponding analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages are issued within 90 days of the same 
earnings announcement. However, we note that our findings are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects. 
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recommendations following the announcement of negative firm news. This result is also 
consistent with the results in Table 3 that suggest analysts employed by sanctioned brokerages 
respond by reducing the optimism in their stock recommendations. 
4.4 Cross-Sectional Variation Based on Violations for Issuing Misleading Research  
 As discussed in Section 3.2, we classify each regulatory action into one or more of five 
different categories based on the description of the nature of the brokerage’s violation. Given 
that our dependent variables focus on analysts’ research output (stock recommendation 
optimism) before and after the sanction, we examine whether our findings are more pronounced 
for violations related to the issuance of misleading research than following other types of 
regulatory actions.12 We modify Equation (1) to separately examine the association between 
regulatory actions for issuing misleading research and analysts’ subsequent stock 
recommendations and present the results in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Column (1), the coefficient on Post_Action remains negative and significant (-0.145, 
p-value < 0.01), suggesting that, on average, violations unrelated to the issuance of misleading 
research are associated with decreases in stock recommendation levels. Importantly, we also find 
a significantly negative coefficient on MISLEAD*Post_Action (-0.305, p-value < 0.01), which 
suggests that the reduction in the favorableness of analysts’ stock recommendation following 
regulatory actions is even greater among analysts employed by brokerages sanctioned for issuing 
misleading research. We find similar results in Column (2) when we use Downgrade as the 
dependent variable and in Column (3) when SR_Rel is the dependent variable. Specifically, the 
                                                        
12 We note that many violations classified as being associated with the issuance of misleading research also include 
other types of violations (e.g., conflicts of interest associated with investment banking activity). See Appendix B for 
specific examples.  
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coefficient on Post_Action in Column (2) is significantly positive (0.033, p-value < 0.01) and the 
coefficient on MISLEAD*Post_Action is also significantly positive (0.210, p-value < 0.01). In 
Column (3), the coefficient on Post_Action is significantly negative (-0.075, p-value < 0.01) and 
the coefficient on MISLEAD*Post_Action is also significantly negative (-0.270, p-value < 0.01).  
These results provide important evidence of the effect of regulatory sanctions on analyst 
research. While we find that sanctions arising from misconduct directly related to analyst 
research (i.e., misleading research) are associated with subsequent stock recommendation 
changes, even other sanctions that are less directly related to analysts’ published research are 
followed by meaningful reductions in stock recommendation levels. These findings suggest that 
regulators’ routine monitoring of the brokerage industry induces changes in analyst behavior. 
4.5 Recidivist Violators 
 As outlined in Panel B of Table 1, some brokerages are repeat offenders, having been 
subject to more than one regulatory action during our sample period. We examine whether the 
association between regulatory actions and subsequent stock recommendations differs between 
first-time and recidivist offenders. To address this question, we modify Equation (1), as follows: 
DV = β0 + β1Post_Action + β2Recidivist + β3Post_Action*Recidivist + Controls + Year + 
Brokerage + ε        (3) 
Recidivist is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s brokerage was previously 
sanctioned for analyst misconduct within our sample period, and equal to zero otherwise. The 
control variables in Equation (3) are identical to those employed in Equation (1). If analysts at 
sanctioned brokerages are more (less) likely to reduce the optimism in their stock 
recommendations following a subsequent violation, the coefficient on Post_Action*Recidivist 
will be negative (positive).  
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 As outlined in Table 6, we find that the main effect on Post_Action in Column (1) is 
significantly negative (-0.327, p-value < 0.01), consistent with the notion that analysts’ stock 
recommendations become less optimistic following sanctions against their brokerage (H1). The 
coefficient on Post_Action*Recividist, however, is significantly positive (0.240, p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that analysts at sanctioned brokerages are less likely to rein in their stock 
recommendations following recidivist sanctions. We find similar results in Columns (2) and (3).  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.6 Market Reaction to Stock Recommendations Following Sanctions 
 Prior research finds that revisions to analysts’ stock recommendations are associated with 
meaningful stock returns for the covered firm (Francis and Soffer 1997; Bradley et al. 2014). We 
examine the impact of these violations on the market reaction to stock recommendation revisions 
issued by analysts employed by analysts at sanctioned brokerages. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression:  
Ret = β0 + β1Post_Action + β2Upgrade + β3Post_Action*Upgrade + Controls + Year + 
Brokerage + ε        (4) 
Ret is the three-day abnormal return (-1, +1) centered on the date of the stock recommendation 
revision. For reiterated or downgraded recommendations, we multiply Ret by negative one, 
which allows us to test the informativeness of all recommendation levels in the same regression 
based on the expected market reaction to the recommendation. We include an indicator variable, 
Upgrade, to separately examine the market reaction to upgrades vs. downgrades and reiterations 
following regulatory actions. Specifically, the coefficient on Post_Action reflects the difference 
in the market reaction to downgrades and reiterations issued by sanctioned following a 
regulatory event, and the coefficient on Post_Action*Upgrade captures the incremental 
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difference in the market reaction to upgrades issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages after a 
regulatory event. We control for the analyst’s experience following the firm in question 
(Firm_Exp), the number of firms the analyst follows (Follow), the number of analysts following 
the firm (Analyst_Count), brokerage size (Broker_Size), and indicator variables equal to one if 
the firm announces earnings (EA) or some other analyst issues a stock recommendation 
(Other_SR) in the same return accumulation period, and zero otherwise. We also include year 
and brokerage fixed effects and report the results in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 We find a positive and significant coefficient on Post_Action (0.005, p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that downgrades and reiterations to stock recommendations issued by analysts at 
sanctioned brokerages elicit a stronger market reaction after a regulatory event than before. We 
also find a negative and significant coefficient on Post_Action*Upgrade (-0.006, p-value < 0.05), 
which suggests that after a regulatory event, upgrades are less informative and met with more 
skepticism than are downgrades and reiterations.13 In general, our findings are consistent with 
investors believing that downgrades (but not upgrades) issued by analysts at sanctioned 
brokerages are more credible following a regulatory action.  
5. Spillover Effects of Regulatory Actions 
 Corwin et al. (2017) find that analysts employed by brokerages included in the 2003 
Global Settlement reduced their optimistic bias, but they find no evidence of a reduction in 
optimistic bias among analysts employed by other brokerages not included in the Global 
Settlement and conclude that “industry-wide [self-regulatory organization] rules were largely 
ineffective at reducing the influence of investment banking on analyst research.” Motivated by 
                                                        
13 The combined effect of Post_Action and Post_Action*Upgrade is not statistically different from zero (p-value = 
0.611).  
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Corwin et al. (2017) and the importance of understanding the extent to which routine monitoring 
shapes sell-side research, in this section we examine the stock recommendation optimism of peer 
analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages following regulatory sanctions.  
To examine this issue, we augment our sample by including stock recommendations 
issued by analysts at both sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokerages following a given firm at 
the same time. We focus on analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages following the same firms as 
analysts at sanctioned brokerages in order to hold constant the information both groups of 
analysts are responding to when issuing their stock recommendations and to facilitate 
comparisons between both groups of analysts. In addition, a regulatory action against a different 
brokerage is likely more salient to an analyst at a non-sanctioned brokerage if it impacts a peer 
analyst. Similar to the design of our main test, the analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages 
included in this analysis must issue at least one stock recommendation for the firm in the 365 
days before the corresponding action and also within 365 days after the action. We retain the last 
recommendation issued before and the first recommendation issued after the regulatory action. 
We include only firms with at least one analyst at a sanctioned brokerage and at least one analyst 
at a non-sanctioned brokerage in both the pre- and post-action periods. Therefore, this analysis 
includes 42,068 individual stock recommendations issued for a total of 16,639 firm-year 
observations (out of a possible 83,801 firm-year observations during our sample period).  
We modify Equation (1) by adding Sanctioned_Analyst, as well as its interaction with 
Post_Action, as follows: 
SR = β0 + β1Post_Action + β2Sanctioned_Analyst + β3Post_Action*Sanctioned_Analyst + 
Controls + Year + Brokerage + ε     (5) 
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A negative coefficient on Post_Action would suggest the effects of regulatory actions spill over 
to other analysts employed by non-sanctioned brokerages. Given our main results, we expect the 
regulatory action to have a larger effect on analysts at sanctioned brokerages than those at non-
sanctioned brokerages; thus, we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction between 
Post_Action and Sanctioned_Analysts. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
  In Panel A of Table 8, we present univariate evidence and find that the average pre-
action recommendation is significantly higher for analysts at sanctioned brokerages (0.614) than 
for analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages (0.579). However, for both groups of analysts, the 
average post-action recommendation is lower than the average pre-action recommendation, and 
the difference in the average post-action recommendation is not significantly different between 
analysts at sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokerages (0.431 and 0.420, respectively). These 
statistics provide initial evidence that regulatory actions lead to reductions in recommendation 
optimism that extend beyond the sanctioned brokerages.  
We present the results of estimating Equation (5) in Panel B of Table 8. In Column (1) 
we find a negative coefficient on Post_Action (-0.101, p-value < 0.01), suggesting analysts at 
non-sanctioned brokerages decrease their stock recommendation levels following the sanction of 
a peer analyst’s brokerage. We also find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
between Post_Action and Sanctioned_Analyst (-0.047, p-value < 0.10), suggesting an 
incremental reduction in stock recommendation optimism among analysts at sanctioned 
brokerages. These results provide evidence that routine monitoring of the sell-side industry 
constrains optimism in analyst research even when an analyst’s brokerage is not directly 
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targeted.14 In Column (2) we add MISLEAD along with its interactions with Post_Action and 
Sanctioned_Analyst and find that the spillover effects we document are driven primarily by 
sanctions against brokerages for having issued misleading research. 
 One question that naturally emerges is why regulatory spillovers were not apparent 
following the Global Settlement (Corwin et al. 2017), when they are evident in our sample of 
routine regulatory actions. Research in criminology suggests that the certainty of punishment is 
far more likely to deter misbehavior than is the severity of the potential punishment (Nagin 
2013). Our finding that regular, routine monitoring of sell-side brokerages has spillover effects to 
peer analysts is consistent with this intuition.  
 We note that our tests do not allow us to determine whether these spillovers are the result 
of efforts by analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages to avoid regulatory scrutiny or by analysts at 
non-sanctioned brokerages—potentially unaware of the regulatory action—observing the less 
favorable stock recommendations issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages and “herding” in 
response to these revised recommendations. Nevertheless, regardless of the motivation for it, the 
end result is that regulatory actions lead to less optimistically biased stock recommendations 
issued by both analysts at sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokerages, consistent with the goal of 
enhancing investor protection and encouraging a level playing field for all investors.  
6. Conclusion 
 Because sell-side analysts play an important role in the capital markets, their activities are 
monitored by regulators, including the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). We 
                                                        
14 These results should not be interpreted to mean that all analysts lower their stock recommendations for all firms 
they follow after a regulatory action against one brokerage. Importantly, this analysis focuses only on the subset of 
firms followed by analysts at a sanctioned brokerage. The majority of covered firms are not included in this analysis, 
and analysts are much less likely to revise their stock recommendations for those firms in response to these 
regulatory actions.  
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examine a sample of 81 regulatory actions against sell-side brokerages from 1994 to 2014 to 
examine the impact of these sanctions on the research activities of the analysts they employ. We 
find that the stock recommendations analysts issue immediately after their brokerage is 
sanctioned are less optimistic than (a) the stock recommendations the same analysts issued for 
the same firms immediately prior to the regulatory action, and (b) the stock recommendations 
issued by other (non-sanctioned) analysts covering the same firms. This result is particularly 
pronounced for analysts employed by brokerages sanctioned for having issued misleading 
research to investors. We find that peer analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages also issue less 
optimistic recommendations following sanctions against other brokerages, consistent with 
regulatory spillovers to routine oversight of sell-side research. In general, our findings suggest 
that regulatory oversight helps mitigate some of the optimistic bias inherent in sell-side analysts’ 
stock recommendations (Agrawal and Chen 2008). 
 We also examine how analysts employed by sanctioned brokerages respond to negative 
news about the firms they cover. Relative to analysts at non-sanctioned brokerages following the 
same firms, we find that analysts employed by brokerages recently sanctioned are more likely to 
downgrade the firm’s stock following a negative earnings surprise. Given the salience of 
earnings announcements and analysts’ importance in helping investors process earnings news, 
this finding speaks to the important role of routine oversight of sell-side research. We also find 
that the market reaction to downgrades issued by analysts at sanctioned brokerages is stronger 
following regulatory sanctions, but we do not find the same result for upgrades.  
 Although we focus on properties of analysts’ stock recommendations, we acknowledge 
that sell-side analysts provide other important services and that regulators’ ability to effectively 
monitor sell-side brokerages goes beyond imposing discipline on sell-side research. However, 
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we argue that the observable consequences of regulatory sanctions that we document suggest that 
regulators impose discipline on the sell-side industry in other, unobservable ways. As a result, 
our findings speak to the effectiveness of regulatory oversight of the sell-side industry. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
   
Variable  Definition 
Dependent Variables 
   
SR  The analyst’s recommendation level, where strong buy is equal to 2, 
buy is equal to 1, hold is equal to 0, sell is equal to -1, and 
underperform is equal to -2. 
Downgrade  Equal to one if the recommendation level is lower than 
the analyst’s previous recommendation level for the 
covered firm, and zero otherwise. 
SR_Rel  The analyst’s recommendation level minus the consensus 
recommendation issued for the firm. 
Ret  Three-day abnormal return (-1,+1) centered on the date of the stock 
recommendation revision, with the abnormal return is multiplied by -
1 for reiterated and downgraded recommendations. 
   
Independent Variables (in alphabetical order) 
   
Analyst_Count  The number of analysts following the covered firm. 
Bhar   The covered firm’s buy and hold abnormal returns in the month prior 
to the stock recommendation (target price, earnings forecast). 
Broker_Size  The number of analysts employed by the analyst's brokerage minus 
the minimum number of analysts employed by brokerages for 
analysts following the same firm in the same year, scaled by the 
range of brokerage size for all analysts following the firm that year 
(Clement and Tse 2003, 2005).  
Buy  Equal to one if the analyst’s prior recommendation was a buy rating, 
and zero otherwise. 
COI  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days before or after a sanction was initiated against the analyst’s 
brokerage related to conflict of interest, analyst compensation, 
investment banking, and/or analyst trading violations, and zero 
otherwise. 
Consensus  The average outstanding stock recommendation level issued by other 
analysts as of the date the analyst in question issues her stock 
recommendation. 
EA  Equal to one if the covered firm announced earnings during the 
return accumulation period, and zero otherwise. 
Fine  The monetary fine included in the sanction. 
Follow  The number of companies the analyst follows minus the minimum 
number of companies followed by analysts who follow the same 
firm in the same year, scaled by the range in the number of 
companies followed by analysts following the firm that year 
(Clement and Tse 2003, 2005). 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
   
Gen_Exp  The number of years of experience the analyst has minus the 
minimum number of years of experience for analysts following the 
same firm in the same year, scaled by the range of years of 
experience for analysts following firm the firm that year (Clement 
and Tse 2005). 
Meetbeat  Equal to one if the firm met or beat the consensus earnings forecast 
in the prior fiscal period, and zero otherwise. 
MISLEAD  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days before or after a sanction was initiated against the analyst’s 
brokerage related to misleading information, and zero otherwise. 
NONPUB  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days before or after a sanction was initiated against the analyst’s 
brokerage related to inappropriate distribution of draft reports, 
nonpublic information, and/or the failure to manage analyst public 
appearances, and zero otherwise. 
OTHER  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days before or after a sanction was initiated against the analyst’s 
brokerage related to brokerages failure to comply with ongoing 
investigations and/or actions related to unregistered individuals, and 
zero otherwise. 
Other_SR  Equal to one if another analyst issued a stock recommendation for 
the covered firm during the return accumulation period, and zero 
otherwise. 
Post_Action  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days following a regulatory action against the analyst’s brokerage, 
and zero otherwise. 
Recidivist  Equal to one if the analyst’s brokerage was previously sanctioned for 
analyst misconduct, and zero otherwise. 
Sanctioned_Analyst  Equal to one if the analyst is employed by a sanctioned brokerage, 
and zero otherwise. 
Sell  Equal to one if the analyst’s prior recommendation was a sell rating, 
and zero otherwise. 
StrongBuy  Equal to one if the analyst’s prior recommendation was a strong buy 
rating, and zero otherwise. 
SUPER  Equal to one if the stock recommendation was issued within 365 
days before or after a sanction was initiated against the analyst’s 
brokerage related to failure to adequately supervise analysts and/or 
failure to include require disclosures in analyst research reports, and 
zero otherwise. 
Underperform  Equal to one if the analyst’s prior recommendation was an 
underperform rating, and zero otherwise. 
Underwriter  Equal to one if the analyst is employed by a brokerage affiliated with 
an investment banking department, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
   
Upgrade  Equal to one if the recommendation level is higher than the analyst’s 
previous recommendation level for the covered firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Research-Related Regulatory Actions 
 
Example 1 
Brokerage Piper Jaffray 
Date Initiated 6/25/2002 
Allegations NASD Rule 2110 - without admitting or denying the allegations, the 
respondent member consented to the entry of findings that it inappropriately 
threatened to drop research coverage and to stop making a market in a stock 
if the firm was not selected as lead underwriter for a secondary offering. 
These threats were made in an attempt to force the issuer to engage in 
business on terms favorable to the firm but were not wanted by the issuer. 
Sanctions Censured and fined $250,000 
Violation Categories 
 
COI 
Example 2  
Brokerage Sidoti & Company LLC 
Date Initiated 7/18/2007 
Allegations NASD rule 2110 and 2711(c): between September 2, 2004 and July 17, 
2006, the firm sent draft research reports to approximately 200 subject 
companies prior to publication that contained analyst analyses, estimates, 
projections and conclusions. One of those research reports contained a price 
target and research rating. 
Sanctions Without admitting or denying the findings, the firm consented to the 
described sanctions and to the entry of findings; therefore the firm is 
censured and fined $25,000. 
Violation Categories NONPUB 
 
Example 3  
Brokerage Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co. 
Date Initiated 10/17/2006 
Allegations Respondent failed to enforce its written supervisory procedures relating to 
securities transactions by its research analysts and other associated persons 
that required the firm's compliance department to obtain duplicate 
confirmations and statements for all securities accounts maintained by those 
individuals at other firms. Moreover, the compliance department had to 
review those outside account records on at least a quarterly basis. It failed to 
detect and prevent violations of NASD rules 2711, 3050 and 2110 by the 
research analyst. 
Sanctions Censured and fined $15,000. 
Violation Categories SUPER, COI 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Examples of Research-Related Regulatory Actions 
 
Example 4 
Brokerage Feltl & Company 
Date Initiated 7/19/2006 
Allegations Respondent member failed to adopt and implement written supervisory 
procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance concerning research 
reports. The findings stated that the firm published research reports that 
contained misleading statements. 
Sanctions Censured and fined $10,000 
Violation Categories MISLEAD, SUPER 
  
Example 5 
Brokerage Morgan Stanley 
Date Initiated 12/11/2014 
Allegations The findings stated that the firm's research analyst presented to the company 
and its private equity owners (sponsors), during the solicitation period, 
thereby participating in the firm's efforts to solicit investment banking 
business from the company. The firm offered favorable research to induce 
the company to award the firm its investment banking business. Following 
the analyst's presentation, the company asked the firm to complete a template 
showing an "equity commitment committee approv[ed]" valuation of the 
company, which would include the analyst's views on the company's 
valuation. The company and its sponsors asked the firm to complete the 
template and provide a firm-wide valuation that the firm, including its 
analyst, would be expected to support after the company awarded its initial 
public offering (ipo) business, absent unexpected developments. Indeed, the 
company told some firms that the purpose of the template was to prevent the 
company from being "burned" by an analyst's decision to adopt a negative 
view of the company after the company had awarded its investment banking 
business to the analyst's firm. The firm complied with the company's request 
for a valuation that included that analyst's views. Under the circumstances of 
the company's ipo, the firm offered favorable research coverage to induce 
receipt of investment banking business by completing and submitting to the 
company, during the solicitation period, a valuation template requested by 
the company and the sponsors. The firm understood that the company and 
the sponsors wanted a final valuation that the entire firm, including its 
analyst, would support if selected as an underwriter. By providing the 
company the unified valuation it sought, the firm indicated to the company 
that post-ipo research coverage would be positive and aligned with 
investment banking. The company and the sponsors selected the firm as a co-
manager for the company's ipo. The firm declined to participate. The 
company eventually decided not to proceed with the offering. 
Sanctions Censured and fined $4,000,000 
Violation Categories MISLEAD, COI 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Examples of Research-Related Regulatory Actions 
  
Example 6  
Brokerage Suntrust Robinson Humphrey 
Date Initiated 5/4/2005 
Allegations Failed to apply for the research designation for 48 research analysts. Suntrust 
research analysts continued to act as research analysts without passing the 
research analyst qualification examination. When suntrust discovered the 
failure to submit the registration applications, the firm issued 438 research 
reports and updates. Suntrust knew that its research analysts were not 
properly registered, but it issued an additional 202 research reports and 
updates. 
Sanctions Censured and fined $100,000 
Violation Categories OTHER 
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Table 1 
Sample of Research-Related Regulatory Sanctions  
     
Panel A: Sanctions By Year 
     
Year  Number of Sanctions 
1994  1 
1996  2 
2000  1 
2001  2 
2002  3 
2003  10 
2004  10 
2005  8 
2006  9 
2007  4 
2008  5 
2009  3 
2010  3 
2011  7 
2012  4 
2013  2 
2014  7 
Total Sanctions  81 
     
Panel B: Number of Brokerages By Sanction Frequency 
     
Sanction Frequency  Number of Brokerages 
1  36 
2  9 
3  2 
4+  3 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Sample of Research-Related Regulatory Sanctions 
  
Panel C: Number of Sanctions by Type of Violation 
    
Major Sanction Category  
Specific Sanction Category  
Number of 
Sanctions 
 
Number of Related Stock 
Recommendations in the 
Year Before or After 
     
Misleading Research (MISLEAD)   
Misleading information in analyst 
report  
12 
  
1,498 
Total unique sanctions  12  
 
  
   
Conflicts of Interest (COI)  
Conflicts of interest   34  
Analyst compensation  9  
Investment banking  22  
Analyst trading  15  
Total unique sanctions 
 
46 
  
7,922 
     
Non-public Information (NONPUB)  
Provided inappropriate draft report 
to company  5 
 
Release of non-public information  10  
Disclosure of public appearances  3  
Total unique sanctions 
 
18 
  
2,350 
     
Supervision (SUPER)  
Inappropriate supervision  48  
Inappropriate disclosure  37  
Total unique sanctions 
 
65 
  
8,364 
     
Other Violations (OTHER)  
Failure to comply with ongoing 
investigation  3 
 
Unregistered analysts   7  
Total unique sanctions  9  804 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
       
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean        Q1 Median           Q3 Std. Dev. 
       
Dependent Variables 
SR  0.513 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.056 
Downgrade  0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.486 
SR_Rel  -0.046 -0.667 -0.154 0.643 0.920 
       
Independent Variables 
Bhar  0.002 -0.052 0.000 0.051 0.113 
Broker_Size  0.525 0.096 0.579 0.896 0.380 
Firm_Exp  0.444 0.096 0.349 0.829 0.374 
Follow  0.437 0.143 0.385 0.700 0.337 
Gen_Exp  0.528 0.216 0.505 0.886 0.350 
Meetbeat  0.673 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.469 
Post_Action  0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Underwriter  0.908 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.289 
COI  0.698 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.459 
MISLEAD  0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.338 
NONPUB  0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.405 
SUPER  0.737 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.440 
OTHER  0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.257 
Recidivist  0.603 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.489 
Fine (in millions)  6.100 0.250 0.530 5.000 21.000 
       
Panel B: Comparing Pre-Action and Post-Action Recommendation Characteristics 
Variable  Pre-Action  Post-Action  Difference  p-value 
         
SR  0.607  0.418  -0.189***  0.000 
Downgrade  0.356  0.413  -0.057***  0.000 
SR_Rel  0.009  -0.101  -0.110***  0.000 
 
The recommendation sample contains 11,354 stock recommendations relating to 81 research-related 
regulatory actions. The recommendation downgrade sample contains 8,028 observations. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 
Regulatory Actions and Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
       
   Column (1)  Column (2)  Column (3) 
Variable  SR  Downgrade  SR_Rel 
       
Post_Action   -0.186***  0.393***  -0.112*** 
  (-7.331)  (4.911)  (-5.058) 
Firm_Exp   0.034  -0.214**  0.033 
  (1.141)  (-2.028)  (1.317) 
Gen_Exp  0.027  0.161  0.040 
  (0.716)  (1.300)  (1.244) 
Follow  -0.070*  -0.478***  -0.095*** 
  (-1.656)  (-3.437)  (-2.787) 
Broker_Size  -0.147***  0.290**  -0.322*** 
  (-2.715)  (2.021)  (-7.114) 
Meetbeat  0.103***  -0.171**  0.024 
  (4.466)  (-2.364)  (7.114) 
Bhar  0.054  -0.351  -0.014 
  (0.517)  (-1.104)  (-0.173) 
Underwriter  0.716***  -0.579  0.566*** 
  (3.939)  (-0.852)  (3.084) 
Sell    -5.258***   
    (-5.162)   
Buy    2.004***   
    (21.216)   
StrongBuy    3.083***   
    (24.709)   
Constant  0.846**  -3.154***  0.136 
  (2.521)  (-3.911)  (0.432) 
       
R2/Area Under ROC 0.074  0.854  0.074 
Observations  11,354  8,028  11,354 
       
All regressions include year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by analyst. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with predicted signs. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 4 
Likelihood of Downgrading Stock Recommendations After an Earnings Miss 
   
Variable  Downgrade 
   
Sanctioned_Analyst  0.394** 
  (2.472) 
Firm_Exp  0.072 
  (0.350) 
Gen_Exp  -0.147 
  (-0.689) 
Follow  -0.107 
  (-0.545) 
Broker_Size  -0.077 
  (-0.206) 
Bhar  1.197*** 
  (2.641) 
Underwriter  0.873 
  (0.777) 
Constant  -0.878* 
  (-1.763) 
   
Pseudo R2  0.067 
Observations  1,531 
   
The logistical regression includes year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered 
by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with predicted signs. 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402180 
  48 
Table 5 
Violation Type and Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
    Column (1)  Column (2)  Column (3) 
Variable   SR  Downgrade  SR_Rel 
         
Post_Action    -0.145***  0.033***  -0.075*** 
    (-5.920)  (2.657)  (-3.440) 
MISLEAD    -0.024  -0.108***  -0.012 
    (-0.333)  (-3.477)  (-0.193) 
MISLEAD*Post_Action  -0.305***  0.210***  -0.270*** 
    (-3.178)  (5.937)  (-3.226) 
Firm_Exp    0.028  -0.,031**  0.028 
    (0.949)  (-1.990)  (1.120) 
Gen_Exp    0.022  0.022  0.036 
    (0.592)  (1.171)  (1.123) 
Follow    -0.063  -0.071***  -0.089*** 
    (-1.496)  -3.330)  (-2.634) 
Broker_Size    -0.128**  0.046**  -0.306*** 
    (-2.374)  (2.133)  (-6.791) 
Meetbeat    0.103***  -0.026**  0.024 
    (4.495)  (-2.460)  (1.227) 
Bhar    0.055  -0.051  -0.013 
    (0.529)  (-1.126)  (-0.158) 
Underwriter    0.641***  -0.098  0.503*** 
    (3.491)  (-1.055)  (2.712) 
Sell    -0.177***   
      (-13.513)   
Buy      0.387***   
      (22.271)   
StrongBuy      0.602***   
      (28.819)   
Constant    0.946***  -0.020  0.221 
    (2.814)  (-0.177)  (0.699) 
         
R2/Area Under ROC    0.078  0.367  0.078 
Observations        11,354       8,030     11,354 
 
All regressions include year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by analyst. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with predicted signs. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 
Recidivist Actions and Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
       
   Column (1)  Column (2)  Column (3) 
Variable  SR  Downgrade  SR_Rel 
       
Post_Action   -0.327***  0.976***  -0.199*** 
  (-7.267)  (8.400)  (-5.153) 
Recidivist  -0.072  0.027  0.003 
  (-0.926)  (0.133)  (0.051) 
Post_Action*Recidivist  0.240***  -1.033***  0.155*** 
  (4.511)  (-6.664)  (3.329) 
Firm_Exp   0.037  -0.228**  0.033 
  (1.234)  (-2.131)  (1.355) 
Gen_Exp  0.029  0.150  0.041 
  (0.753)  (1.209)  (1.268) 
Follow  -0.069  -0.503***  -0.093*** 
  (-1.620)  (-3.585)  (-2.711) 
Broker_Size  -0.148***  0.277*  -0.320*** 
  (-2.738)  (1.930)  (-7.081) 
Meetbeat  0.104***  -0.188**  0.025 
  (4.536)  (-2.570)  (1.297) 
Bhar  0.062  -0.369  -0.010 
  (0.592)  (-1.108)  (-0.122) 
Underwriter  0.715***  -0.459  0.535*** 
  (3.839)  (-0.628)  (2.842) 
Sell    -5.221***   
    (-5.128)   
Buy    2.045***   
    (21.704)   
StrongBuy    3.114***   
    (24.186)   
Constant  0.803**  -3.735***  0.189 
  (2.255)  (-4.219)  (0.570) 
       
R2/Area Under ROC 0.077  0.854  0.076 
Observations  11,354  8,028  11,354 
       
All regressions include year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by analyst. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with predicted signs. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 7 
Market Reaction to Stock Recommendation Revisions Following Violation 
   
Variable  Ret 
   
Post_Action  0.005*** 
  (2.662) 
Upgrade  0.008*** 
  (3.343) 
Post_Action*Upgrade  -0.006** 
  (-2.034) 
Firm_Exp  -0.001*** 
  (-3.854) 
Follow  -0.000*** 
  (-3.597) 
Analyst_Count  -0.000** 
  (-2.364) 
Broker_Size  -0.005 
  (-0.520) 
EA  0.023*** 
  (7.619) 
Other_SR  0.023*** 
  (9.956) 
Constant  0.075* 
  (1.922) 
   
R2  0.085 
Observations  9,903 
   
All regressions include year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by analyst. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with predicted signs. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 8 
Regulatory Spillover 
 
Panel A: Univariate Results – All Action Types 
 
All Action Types 
Analyst Type  Pre-Action  Post-Action  Difference  p-value 
Analysts at Sanctioned Brokerage 0.614  0.431  -0.183***  0.000 
Analysts at Non-Sanctioned Brokerage 0.579  0.420  -0.160***  0.000 
     Difference  -0.035**  -0.011     
     p-value  0.030  0.491     
         
MISLEAD Actions Only 
Analyst Type  Pre-Action  Post-Action  Difference  p-value 
Analysts at Sanctioned Brokerage 0.808  0.369  -0.439***  0.000 
Analysts at Non-Sanctioned Brokerage 0.550  0.302  -0.248***  0.000 
     Difference  -0.258***  -0.067     
     p-value  0.000  0.170     
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Table 8 (continued) 
Regulatory Spillover 
  
Panel B: Regression Results 
 
Variable 
Column (1) 
SR 
Column (2) 
SR 
   
Post_Action -0.101*** -0.097*** 
 (-8.739) (-7.725) 
Sanctioned_Analyst 0.049** 0.042* 
 (2.124) (1.792) 
Mislead  -0.044* 
  (-1.814) 
Post_Action*Sanctioned_Analyst -0.047* -0.016 
 (-1.686) (-0.593) 
Post_Action*Mislead  -0.051 
  (-1.509) 
Sanctioned_Analyst*Mislead  0.028 
  (0.387) 
Post_Action*Sanctioned_Analyst*Mislead  -0.234** 
  (-2.105) 
Firm_Exp -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.435) (-0.450) 
Gen_Exp 0.017 0.016 
 (0.878) (0.823) 
Follow -0.038** -0.036* 
 (-1.977) (-1.837) 
Broker_Size -0.103*** -0.117*** 
 (-3.047) (-3.519) 
Meetbeat 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (5.781) (5.724) 
Bhar -0.045 -0.042 
 (-1.097) (-1.018) 
Underwriter -0.243** -0.240** 
 (-2.186) (-2.159) 
Consensus 0.433*** 0.431*** 
 (36.444) (36.370) 
Constant 0.874*** 0.877*** 
 (3.599) (3.617) 
   
R2 0.112 0.113 
Observations 42,068 42,068 
  
The regression includes year and brokerage fixed effects and standard errors are clustered 
by analyst. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with the exception of variables with 
predicted signs. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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